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STATEMENT OF CASE 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the Industrial Commission's decision denying Appellant Sevy's 
(hereafter Sevy) claim for disability benefits in excess of her permanent physical impairment 
rating. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A hearing was held before a Commission Referee and post-hearing depositions were 
taken. The Referee's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not adopted by the 
Commissioners. They entered their own decision which denied Sevy' s claim for disability 
benefits in excess of her impairment physical impairment rating. The Commission denied 
Sevy' s Motion for Reconsideration and this appeal was timely filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sevy began working for SVL Analytical Inc. (SVL) in its "bucking room" on April 29, 
2004. R. p. 60 § 5, Def. Exhibits 12, p. 416. On May 15, 2006 Sevy underwent an anterior 
discectomy and fusion at C5-6, due to a nonindustrial cause, by Dr. Larson. R. p. 63, ,r 12. 
When she was permitted to return work she was assigned a less physically demanding job, in 
shipping and receiving, as an Extraction Lab Technician. R. p. 63, 1 12. The physical 
requirements of the Extraction Lab Technician job are detailed in an Industrial Commission 
Rehabilitation Division's job site evaluation. Bengtson Depo. p. 33, 1.1-6, Exhibit 2. Sevy 
modified how she performed the job's (1) lifting and carrying and (2) pushing and pulling 
physical requirements. She would slide heavy buckets with her foot rather than picking them up, 
use a stick and hook to drag heavy items rather than picking them up, and she would obtain 
assistance from others to help her with heavier tasks as needed. R. p. 81, 1 48. She was 
1. APPELLANT SEVY'S OPENING BRIEF 
successfully performing the Extraction Lab Technician job at the time of her October 31, 2006 
industrial accident. 
SVL permitted employees with dogs to bring them to work. On October 31, 2006, Sevy 
tripped over a co-worker's dog at work and fell hurting her neck. Because of her earlier surgery 
she went to see Dr. Larson. He ordered an MRJ and a CT scan. The CT showed a lucency 
suggestive of a fractured fusion. 
Dr. Larson performed a revision of the fusion on January 19, 2007. R. p. 64, 1 14. In 
February 2007, Sevy expressed her interest in returning to work to Dr. Larson. Id In April 2007, 
Dr. Larson allowed Sevy to return to work and instructed her to avoid lifting more than 40 
pounds. R. p. 63, ,r 12. On July 10, 2007, Dr. Larson recorded in his chart notes that he had 
"been reviewing Ms. Sevy' s job analysis" and that he was going to "send her for a functional 
capacity evaluation to determine any work restrictions." Defs. Exhibits 1. At that time he 
believed Sevy had reached maximum medical improvement. R. p. 66, ,r 16. Dr. Larson referred 
Sevy to a licensed physical therapist, Mark Bengtson, MPT (Bengtson), for a Functional 
Capacity Evaluation (FCE). R. p. 68, ,r 21. An FCE is a standardized test conducted to evaluate 
a person and their musculoskeletal pathologies. Based on actual work simulation activities, the 
FCE results are used to identify the person's physical abilities and limitations as they compare to 
physical requirements of jobs as identified by job site evaluations for five day, forty hour, per 
week. Bengtson Depo. p. 10, 1. 18-p. 11, l. 1. 
Tue only information provided to Bengtson by Dr. Larson was his chart note of July 10, 
2007. It documented that Sevy "had correction of a pseudoarthrosis at C5-6 on January 19, 
2007." Bengtson Depo. p. 11, 1. 20-p. 12, I. 3; Defs. Exhibits 1. Bengtson testified that the nature 
of Sevy's occupational injury for which the FCE was to be conducted was a cervical spine 
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injury surgery and that the upper extremities and the cervical spine were the "predominate 
emphasis" of the FCE. Bengtson Depo. p. 17, 1. 9-15. 
A detailed job site evaluation of the Extraction Lab Technician job, prepared by the 
Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division's (ICRD) consultant Jeff Hanson, was provided 
to Bengtson. Bengtson Depo. p. 35, 1. 6-13, Exhibit 2.1 Bengtson testified that the FCE revealed 
three "critical demands" of the Extraction Lab technician job that Sevy could not physically 
perform. They were (1) lifting and carrying demands, (2) pushing and pulling requirements, and 
(3) reaching above shoulder work.2 Bengtson Depo. p. 34, 1. 23-p. 35, 1. 15. The FCE 
"demonstrated significant functional limitations" in the "the Overhead Work Tolerance subtest." 
Bengtson's FCE report stated that the FCE identified limitations are consistent with Sevy's 
"impairments" due to the correction of a pseudoarthrosis at C5-6 on January 19, 2007 as set forth 
in Dr. Larson's July 10th chart note. Bengtson Depo. Exhibit 1, p. 320; Defs. Exhibits 1, p. 
On August 6, 2007, ICRD Consultant Hanson sent a letter to Dr. Larson informing him 
that he was working with Sevy "regarding her industrial injury to her neck." Hanson asked Dr. 
Larson whether his objective data indicated Sevy could return to her pre-injury 
position/occupation as an Extraction Lab technician. Dr. Larson replied to Consultant Hanson 
that Sevy could not return to her time of accident job. He identified Sevy' s physical 
limitations/restrictions as being those set forth in Bengtson' s FCE report. Larson Depo. Exhibit 
2; Larson Depo. p.41, 1. 25-p. 43, L 16. 
1 As reflected by Exhibit 2 to Bengtson's deposition, he was also provided the ICRD job site 
evaluation for another job, "Sample Receiving Technician". This job had the same reaching 
above shoulder requirements as the requirements of her time of accident job as a Extraction Lab 
Technician. 
2 Prior to her industrial accident Sevy only modified the job's (1) lifting and carrying and (2) 
pushing and pulling physical requirements. There is no evidence indicating she had any 
difficulties with above shoulder reaching. R. p. 81,148. 
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On October 3, 2007, the employer/surety had Dr. Stevens conduct an LC. § 72-424 
"Permanent impairment evaluation." His report documents that his evaluation was based on the 
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition. R. p. 67, ,r 19. He 
opined that Sevy had a 12% permanent physical impairment of her neck. He apportioned 10% of 
the impairment rating to her cervical condition preexisting Sevy' s accident and 2% of the 
impairment rating to her industrial accident "and attendant cervical spine fusion revison." Id.; 
R. p. 73-74, ,r 31. Despite his opinion that Sevy had a total of 12% permanent physical 
impairment of her cervical spine, with 2% impairment apportioned to her work accident/injury, 
in a separate section of his report Dr. Stevens projected that Sevy would have no 
limitations/restrictions at all due to her cervical spine. 
On October 12, 2007, Sevy's employer, SVL, informed ICRD consultant Terry Parsons 
that it did not have a job for Sevy to return to work to perform. Def. Exhibit 12, p. 367. On that 
same day, as documented by the ICRD's case note for October 12th, the ICRD decided to not 
provide Sevy with any job placement assistance. The ICRD closed Sevy's case. Def. Exhibit 
13. Dan Brownell, a retired 29 year ICRD employee and supervisor, testified that he was present 
at the time when it was decided to close Sevy' s case. He explained that the basis for closing 
Sevy's ICRD case was that one of the ICRD consultants had quit and the ICRD was left short-
handed. Brownell testified that the ICRD decided to resolve its staffing shortage by closing out 
that consultant's caseload. As a part of that decision, Sevy's case was closed. Tr. p. 217, 1. 7-2; 
p. 269, 1. 5-6; p. 271, 1. 6-10; p. 323, l. 1-8. Brownell testified that did the ICRD ever provide 
Sevy with any job location/placement assistance. Tr. p. 269, 1. 22-p. 270, 1. 11. 
The manner of closing Sevy's ICRD file is revealed by the ICRD case notes. The 
October 7, 2007 note states that SVL does not have work for the claimant and that it was 
4. APPELLANT SEVY'S OPENING BRIEF 
recommended to Sevy that she register for unemployment benefits with the Department of 
Labor. Sevy testified that when she went to register for benefits she did not receive any because 
she was told that she had not been released by the doctors and that it would be in her best interest 
to wait. Tr. p. 121, 1. 19-p. 122, 1. 10. This ICRD note also asserts that Sevy "does not with [sic] 
to utilize any ICRD vocational services." Sevy testified that she did not tell anyone that she did 
not want help from the ICRD finding a job. Tr. p. 120, 1. 19-p. 121, p. 1. Also, contrary to 
October 7th note, the October 12th note entitled "Disability Issues/Final Outcome" asserts that 
"claimant is currently employed." She was not employed. The case notes were finally corrected 
by the ICRD over a month later, on November 16th, to reflect that she was not employed at the 
time of her case closure. The October 12th note also asserts that when Sevy was employed at 
SVL she was earning $10.00 per hour. Sevy testified that she did not earn that amount at any 
time. Tr. p. 121, I. 2-14. Sevy's testimony is confirmed by the ICRD March 6, 2007 case note, 
under "Vocational Issues," that states that she was paid $7.50 per hour. 
Left on her own, without any vocational assistance from the ICRD, Sevy was unable to 
locate any regularly available job for which she could be hired. Tr. p. 121, 1. 2-14. Sevy's 
medication regime consisted ofhydrocodone 10, Flexeril 10, Xanax 0.5 and if the pain increased 
she would take an OxyContin instead of a hydrocodone.3 Tr. p. 32, 1. 21- p. 33, 1. 16. Sevy 
attempted to work for a neighbor by doing limited house cleaning two hours a day, but she was 
not able to continue it. Tr. p. 124, 1. 11-21. Sevy applied for other work at Harvest Foods, Yokes 
grocery, Conoco, Dave Smith Motors, Silver Mountain waterpark, Wayside market, Walmart, 
McDonalds, Subway, Silver Spoon, and attended a job fair. She did not get a return call or an 
interview from any employer. Tr. p. 128-129, p. 131-133. 
3 The medication makes her tired and makes it very hard to concentrate. Tr. p. 34, 1. 1-8. 
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Near the end of 2009, Sevy's daughter qualified for a State of Idaho welfare program 
named the Idaho Child Care Program and referred to as the ICCP program. Sevy's daughter told 
her that the ICCP program may pay her to watch her three grandchildren. Sevy applied by filling 
out ICCP paperwork and went to an orientation. ICCP conducted a home inspection and after 
about six months Sevy was approved to babysit her grandchildren and be paid as part of the 
program. Taking care of the grandchildren for five hours a day while her daughter of was at 
work consisted of cooking them dinner, giving the baby a bath in the sink, and changing the 
baby's diaper. \Vith the help of her husband and her oldest grandchild, Sevy was able to babysit. 
Tr. p. 134-137. Sevy babysat her grandchildren, except for a two month period, from July 28, 
2010unti1November2011. Tr.p.177,1.17-p.180. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Commission's decision that Sevy's did not suffer disability in 
excess of her impairment rating is supported by substantial competent evidence? 
ARGUMENT 
The Commission's decision that Sevy did not suffer disability in excess of 
her impairment rating is not supported by substantial competent evidence. 
This Court exercises free review over the Commission's conclusions of law, but it will 
not disturb the Commission's factual findings if they are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Knowlton v. Wood River Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 135, 140, 254 P.3d 36, 41 (2011). 
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion. McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 584-85, 272 P.3d 554, 556-
57 (2012). 
It is Sevy's position that the Commission's reliance on the testimony of Dr. Larson in 
denying disability, which it twice rejected as not persuasive, is not substantial competent 
evidence. 
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The Commission rejected Dr. Larson's testimony in the following instances: 
1. The Commission adopted the opinion of Dr. J. Craig Stevens that Sevy's cervical spine 
had a total impairment rating of 12% and that 2% of this total rating was due to Sevy's industrial 
accident. The Commission determined that Dr. Stevens persuasively supported his opinion based 
on the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition (2011) and that he 
provided thorough rationale for his apportionment of 2% of the total rating to Sevy' s 
accident/injury. The Commission rejected Dr. Larson's opinion, given by him almost five years 
after Sevy was evaluated by Dr. Stevens and without an actual impairment evaluation, that 
Sevy' s accident and attendant fusion revision did not add any impairment to her cervical spine. 
R. p. 73,131. 
2. The Commission adopted the Functional Capacity Evaluation results of, and as 
explained by, Mark Bengtson, MPT, and rejected Dr. Larson's conflicting opinions. R. p. 69-70, 
1 35.The Commission also noted that Dr. Larson mistakenly believed that Bengtson's FCE did 
not contain any restrictions related to the cervical spine despite the fact that he clearly identified 
limitations/restrictions due to Sevy's cervical spine. R. p. 94. 
Despite rejecting Dr. Larson's opinions, the Commission in an inexplicable shift in its 
analysis based its decision to deny Sevy disability benefits on them. 4 It stated: 
1. "Claimant's treating physician has cogently testified that with the successful 
fusion revision, Claimant has returned to base line without any additional 
limitations that can fairly be referred to that accident. We find this 
testimony persusasive. R. p. 81, 1 49. 
2. "Central to the Commission's original decision is the opinion of Dr. Larson, 
Claimant's treating physician ... the Commission found persuasive his testimony 
4 The Commission's reliance on these two opinions of Dr. Larson directly conflict with the its 
adoption of the opinion of Dr. Stevens that Sevy suffered a 2% permanent impairment as a result 
of her accident/injury. 
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that while the subject accident is responsible for causing or contributing to the 
failure of the C5-6 fusion, the accident did nothing to increase Claimant's 
permanent limitations/restrictions." R. p. 93. 
In apparent disregard of its adoption of Dr. Stevens's impairment rating, the Commission 
utilized a separate section of Dr, Stevens's report entitled "Physical Restrictions" to buttress its 
utilization of Dr. Larson's rejected opinions. Defs. Exhibit 2, p. 6 ,r 1. The Commission did so 
by referencing Dr. Stevens's said non-rating analysis statement and stated that Dr. Stevens 
proposed that Sevy has no limitations/restrictions whatsoever with respect to her cervical spine. 
R. p. 80, ,r 47. The Commission also found, despite the fact that Sevy testified her accident 
permanently worsened her cervical spine condition, that it found the rejected opinions of Dr. 
Larson and Dr. Stevens's proposal of no limitations/restrictions to be more persuasive than Sevy. 
R. p. 94. In doing so, the Commission failed to address its contradictory fmding, based on Dr. 
Stevens's opinion, that Sevy's cervical condition's impairment had increased due to her accident 
and surgery. It also failed to discuss the fact that Dr. Stevens's proposal was that Sevy had no 
limitations/restrictions whatsoever with respect to her cervical spine and the fact that his 
proposal was based on his erroneous understanding that Bengtson's FCE did not relate to her 
cervical spine condition. Defs. Exhibit 2, p. 6 ,r 1. Dr. Stevens projection that Sevy's injury and 
surgery will not result in restrictions is not substantial competent evidence to support the 
Commissions reliance on Dr. Larson's rejected opinions. 
Impairment and disability are conceptually distinct, but it is a precondition that there 
must an impairment in order for disability to exist. In a situation where there is a pre-existing 
impairment, there must be an increased level of impairment in order for a compensable disability 
due to an accident to exist. Urry v. Walker and Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 754, 
769 P. 2d 1122, 1126 (1989). Substantial competent evidence does not support the Commission's 
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decision that Sevy did not suffer any disability in excess of her impairment rating. The 
Commission rejected Dr. Larson's opinions that Sevy did not have any cervical 
limitations/restrictions whatsoever or suffer any impairment rating due to her work injury and 
surgery. The projection by Dr. Stevens, that Sevy would not have any restrictions due to her 
cervical condition, whatsoever, cannot be reconciled with his opinion that she had a preexisting 
impairment that was increased by her accident/injury because to do so would nullify his 
permanent impairment rating and it was based on his erroneous belief that Bengtson' s FCE did 
not identify any cervical limitations/restrictions. 
The statutory definition of "permanent impairment" is set forth at Idaho Code § 72-422, 
The statutory description what a "permanent impairment evaluation [rating]" constitutes is set 
forth in Idaho Code § 72-424. 
I.C. § 72-422. Permanent impairment.-"Permanent Impairment" is any anatomic 
or functional abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been 
achieved and which abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or 
nonprogressive at the time of evaluation. 
I.C. § 72-424. Permanent impairment evaluation.-"Evaluation (rating) of permanent 
Impairment" is a medical appraisal of the nature and extent of the injury or disease as it 
affects an injured employee's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as 
self-care, communication, normal living posture, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and 
nonspecialized activities of bodily members." 
The definition of "permanent impairment" contained in the A.MA Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition (2011), utilized by Dr. Stevens and adopted 
by the Commission is consistent with I.C. §§ 72-422 and 72-424. 
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition (2011). 
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"A loss, loss of use, or derangement of any body part, organ system, organ function."5 
Understanding The AMA GUIDES in Workers' Compensation, Fifth Edition (2011) 
underscores the fact that before a condition can qualify for an impairment rating under the A.MA 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition (2011), that the physical 
condition must interfere with a person's activities of daily living.6 Inherent in the Commission's 
finding that Sevy qualified for a 2% permanent partial impairment rating over and above her 
preexisting cervical condition, are the requirements that her accident/injury (1) caused an 
anatomic or functional abnormality or loss in excess of her pre-accident/injury condition, and (2) 
that her newly suffered anatomic or functional abnormality or loss interferes with her activities 
of daily living beyond what she suffered prior to her accident/injury. Before the Commission 
could fmd that Sevy suffered an increased permanent impairment due to her accident/injury it 
was required to fmd that her accident/injury caused her to suffered a loss of use, or an anatomic 
or functional abnormality, of her body that impacts her daily living activities, beyond what it was 
before the accident/injury.7 
The test for determining whether or not a claimant has met the burden of proving 
disability in excess of the impairment rating, is whether the physical impairment, taken in 
conjunction with nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful activity. 
Graybill v. Swift & Company, 115 Idaho 293, 766 P.2d 763 (1988). In sum, the determination of 
permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity. Sund v. Gambrel, 
127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 763 (1995). 
5 See Appendix, AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition p. 2. 
6 See Appendix, Understanding The AMA GUIDES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Fifth 
Edition, p. 5-7 [A]. 
7 As discussed below, this new impact beyond what it was before the accident/injury was the 
limitation/restriction regarding reaching above shoulder identified in the Bengtson FCE results. 
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On October 3, 2007, Dr. Stevens conducted an Idaho Code § 72-424 permanent 
impairment evaluation rating and, by utilizing the AAfA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, 5th Edition (2011), it was his opinion, that Sevy suffered a 2% permanent 
impairment increase over her pre-accident/injury cervical condition as a result of her industrial 
accident. Dr. Larson did not undertake an examination of Sevy for the purpose of a permanent 
impairment evaluation rating at any time during. Almost five years later during his deposition 
Dr. Larson testified, without elaboration or explanation of the basis of his testimony, that he did 
not believe that Sevy suffered a physical impairment due to her industrial accident and surgery. 
Larson Depo. p. 26, 1. 19-p. 27, 1. 2. The Commission adopted Dr. Stevens's permanent physical 
impairment rating. It did so because if found that the analysis in Dr. Stevens's report 
"persuasively demonstrates a basis for a 12% PPI rating" and because it "provides a rationale for 
apportioning this impairment rating between the effects of the subject accident and Claimant's 
pre-existing condition."8 R. p. 73, ,r 31. 
By adopting the permanent impairment evaluation rating of Dr. Stevens, the Commission, 
rejected Dr. Larson's opinion that Sevy had no limitations, restrictions or rating as a result of her 
October 31, 2006, work accident. R. p. 73-74, ,r 31. By adopting Dr. Stevens's permanent 
impairment evaluation rating, under the relevant statutory definitions, the Commission implicitly 
rejected the portion of his report set forth under "Physical Restrictions" that projected that Sevy 
"has no limitations/restrictions whatsoever with respect to her cervical spine condition." R. p. 80, 
,r 47. Determining that Sevy suffered no limitations/restrictions is incongruous with the 
Commission's adoption of Dr. Stevens'sA.MA Guides based impairment evaluation rating of2% 
which the Commission found persuasive. 
8 See Appendix, Dr. Stevens's rationale for establishing the apportioned impairment rating. 
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After having found that Sevy suffered a 2% permanent impairment, which by definition 
requires an anatomic or functional abnormality or loss that interferes with her activities of daily 
living, the Commission should have continued with its analysis from there and considered 
whether, in conjunction with her 2% rating, Sevy's nonmedical factors reduced her capacity for 
gainful activity. However, instead of so continuing its evaluation, the Commission proceeded by 
evaluating Sevy's nonmedical factors in conjunction with Dr. Larson's previously rejected 
opinion that Sevy had no new limitations/restrictions just because of the fusion redo and his 
opinion that the accident did not result in a permanent impairment. In denying Sevy' s motion for 
reconsideration, in direct conflict with its finding of a 2% permanent impairment and its rejection 
of Dr. Larson's understanding of Sevy's limitations/restrictions to the extent his understanding 
was different than as identified by Bengston's FCE, the Commission erroneously asserted that 
Dr. Larson's testimony in this regard "is not challenged by other medical opinion ofrecord." R. 
p. 94. His testimony is challenged by the impairment rating of Dr. Stevens and the FCE results. 
In its Order Denying Reconsideration, the Commission stated that "Central to the 
Commission's original decision is the opinion of Dr. Larson ... [that] the accident did nothing to 
increase Claimant's permanent limitations/restrictions." (emphasis added). R. p. 93. The 
Commission again contradicted itself. It failed to even attempt to reconcile (1) the fact that Dr. 
Larson specifically adopted the limitations/restrictions identified in Bengtson' s FCE findings in 
his August 2007 response to ICRD Consultant Hanson that Sevy could not perform the her time 
of accident job and (2) the fact that Dr. Larson's testimony revealed that, at least at the time of 
his testimony five years later, he had literally no recollection or understanding of the fact that 
Bengtson' s FCE clearly identified that Sevy' s limitations/restrictions were due to her cervical 
condition. R. p. 94. As a result the Commission silently discredited its specific determination 
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that Bengtson's testimony was more persuasive than Larson's to the extent that Larson's 
opinions conflicted with Bengtson's FCE results. R. p. 69, i2s. 
It is incongruous for the Commission, having found that Sevy suffered a permanent 
impairment evaluation rating pursuant to the statutory definitional requirements and the AMA 
Guides and having found that Bengtson's FCE and testimony were more persuasive than Dr. 
Larson, for the Commission to rely on Dr. Larson's testimony as the "Central" basis for its 
decision denying Sevy disability in excess of impairment. Dr. Larson's twice rejected opinions 
are not substantial competent evidence that support the Commission's decision that Sevy failed 
to demonstrate that she has any limitations/restrictions of a permanent nature which can be 
referred to the subject accident. 
The Commission assertion that it was "unable to conclude that the subject accident did 
anything but cause an additional 2% permanent physical impairment of Claimant's cervical 
spine" appears to gloss over the statutory prerequisites to its finding the existence of a permanent 
impairment. A 2% impairment rating is not an abstract number that has no relationship to a 
person's limitations/restrictions from an injury. The Commission's finding that Sevy suffered a 
permanent impairment rating in excess of any existing in her cervical spine prior to her 
accident/injury and its fmding that Bengtson's FCE is more persuasive than the opinions of Dr. 
Larson and Dr. Stevens, preclude it from determining that Sevy did not suffer any physical 
limitation/restriction caused by her accident and injury. 
Sevy suffered a drastic reduction, elimination, of her capacity for gainful activity as a 
result of her accident/injury. When Sevy reached maximum medical improvement she was not 
released to return to her time of accident job by Dr. Larson. Dr. Larson informed the ICRD that 
she could not perform her job. He specifically based his opinion on the FCE he referred her for 
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and the limitations/restrictions that it identified. The Commission's finding that "the subject 
accident did not cause any additional permanent limitations/restrictions which could be 
responsible for contributing to Claimant's disability" failed to reflect an appreciation that its 
finding of Sevy' s permanent impairment rating established the existence of an anatomic or 
functional abnormality of the injured body part which, by definition, reflects a permanent 
impairment that "affects an injured employee's personal efficiency in the activities of daily 
living." R. p. 82 ,r 50, LC. § 72-424. 
The failure to recognize the inherent requirements of an impairment rating also 
misdirected the decision's analysis ofISIF liability. As a result the Commission's held that Sevy 
could not meet two of the four elements of ISIF liability because she "failed to demonstrate that 
she has any limitations/restrictions of a permanent nature which can be referred to the subject 
accident." R. p. 82, ,r 51. In this regard the Commission, based fully on its unsupportable reliance 
on Dr. Larson's testimony, held: 
1. "Since we have found that the subject accident did not contribute to Claimant's 
limitations/restrictions, we find that the October 31, 2006 accident does not 
constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment. R. p. 83, ,r 53. 
2. "Here, Claimant cannot demonstrate that the subject accident combined with her 
documented pre-existing conditions to cause total and permanent disability. The 
subject accident did not result in any additional limitations/restrictions which 
impacted Claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity." R. p. 83, ,r 54. 
The FCE performed at the time Sevy reached maximum medical improvement and, at 
that time, endorsed by Dr. Larson to the ICRD establish that Sevy was not physically able to 
return to her time of accident job. The FCE identified three of the time of accident job tasks that 
Sevy could not perform. They were (1) lifting and carrying, (2) pushing and pulling, and (3) 
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reaching above shoulder. Bengtson Depo. p. 34, 1. 23-p. 35, 1. 15. The "reaching above 
shoulder" was a newly identified limitation/restriction arising after her injury/surgery. Prior to 
Sevy's accident there is no evidence that she had any restriction/limitation regarding reaching 
above shoulder height up to 33% of the time while working. There was no evidence that this 
reaching above shoulder height requirement had been accommodated prior to her accident or that 
the job requirements had been modified. The only modifications of the Extraction Lab 
Technician job requirements that Sevy implemented were (1) lifting and carrying and (2) 
pushing and pulling. She modified these job tasks by sliding heavy buckets with her foot rather 
than picking them up, using a stick and hook to drag heavy items rather than picking them up, 
and obtaining assistance from others to help her with heavier tasks. R. p. 81, ,r 48. 
The only vocational expert that utilized Sevy' s post-accident/injury FCE identified new 
reaching above shoulder restriction/limitation was Dan Brownell. He testified that due to Sevy' s 
FCE identified reaching limitations/restrictions that she lost 99% of her time of accident access 
to the labor market. Hr. T. p. 245, 1. 19-20. The vocational witness for SVL, Dr. Nancy Collins, 
testified that when Sevy' s reaching limitations/restrictions are taken into account that she lost 
90% of her time of injury access to the labor market. Dr. Collins Depo. p. 49, 1. 2-5. 
The Commission acknowledged that Sevy's nonmedical factors, including her lack of 
transferrable skills and her poor education, in and of themselves placed her at disability of 50-
75%. R. p. 77, ,r 41. Sevy's post-industrial injury/surgery physical reaching limitation from her 
injury eliminated her from 90% (Dr. Collins) to 99% (Dan Brownell) of the jobs in Sevy's labor 
market. This overwhelming loss of access to any job in conjunction with her nonmedical factors 
placed Sevy at 100% disability and also within the odd-lot category for total disability. 
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The Commission's decision asserted that Sevy could not qualify as an odd-lot worker 
because she successfully obtained employment from the State of Idaho to care for her 
grandchildren under a program referred to as the ICCP program. R. p. 78, ,r 43. Since odd-lot 
workers are by definition not absolutely helpless, the mere fact that Sevy obtained employment 
babysitting her grandchildren is not conclusive as to question of total permanent disability. Even 
if a claimant obtains a job, if the job obtained is not of a type that is "regularly and continuously" 
available or it was obtained due to unusual circumstances, it is irrelevant for the purposes of the 
odd-lot doctrine. Bybee v. State, 129 Idaho 76, 83, 921 P.2d 1200, 1206 (1996). Bybee involved 
a claim where the claimant was also employed by the State of Idaho and the Commission found 
that the Idaho State Department of Parks was a "sympathetic employer" even though the job the 
claimant was performing was one regularly and continuously available. 
SVL's vocational witness, Dr. Collins, testified that she has over twenty years of 
providing disability analysis and expert opinion reports in five to six workers' compensations a 
month across the entirety of the State ofldaho. Collins Depo. p. 10-12. She testified that she did 
not know anything about the ICCP program. Dr. Collins testified that she had never researched 
it, did not know what ICCP stands for, and that she did not know how it worked. Collins Depo. 
p. 54, 1. 13-20. 
Mr. Brownell testified that a person being paid through the ICCP program to take care of 
her grandchildren, so that her daughter could attempt to work, was not a job in the competitive 
labor market. This state aid type of program is "sheltered environment" work in a "sympathetic 
situation."9 Tr. p. 266, 1. 16-19. Sevy was not even required to undergo any physical examination 
9 ICCP' s website is http:/ /healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Portals/0/Children/ChildCare/HW0219 .pdf 
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or to establish that she had any physical capacity. The ICCP requirement was essentially having 
an appropriately safe home situation for the grandchildren. 
The decision asserts that "In the final analysis, the only support for finding that 
Claimant's functional abilities were permanently impacted by the accident of October 31, 2006 is 
found in the testimony of the Claimant herself." In so asserting the Commission erroneously 
relies on Dr. Larson's rejected opinions. It also refers to Dr. Stevens' projection, based on his 
misunderstanding of Bengtson's FCE, that Sevy, despite his opinion that she has a total 
permanent impairment of her cervical spine of 12%, has no limitations/restrictions "whatsoever" 
with respect to her cervical spine. R. p. 80, ,r 47. The rejected opinions of Dr. Larson and the 
rejected projection of Dr. Stevens, are in total conflict with Dr. Stevens's 12% total impairment 
rating assessment. They are not substantial competent evidence. Further in this regard, the 
Commission states that Bengtson's testimony and FCE do not support a finding that Sevy has 
limitations/restrictions that are referable to her accident. This finding is not supported the FCE or 
his testimony. Bengtson's testimony and FCE, which the Commission found more persuasive 
than Dr. Larson's testimony specifically identified Sevy's post-accident/injury 
limitation/restriction of reaching above shoulder were due to her cervical condition. Sevy did not 
have this limitation before the accident. 
The Commission's finding that Dr. Larson's testimony, records and objective medical 
testing are more persuasive than Sevy's testimony that she experienced a permanent worsening 
of her condition following her accident is not supported by substantial competent evidence. This 
finding is also directly contrary to the Commission's adoption of the 2% permanent impairment 
of Dr. Stevens and its finding Bengtson' s FCE and testimony more persuasive than Dr. Larson's. 
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Sevy worked full time for SVL prior to her industrial accident. She was injured and 
underwent surgery. When she reached maximum medical improvement the FCE documented 
that she could not return to the job she was performing for SVL at the time of her injury due to 
reaching limitations that she had never before experienced. Dr. Larson at that time adopted the 
FCE in total and did not release her to return to her time of accident job. 
The Commission's finding that it is "unable to define a specific numerical disability 
rating based on the totality of Claimant's physical ailments and relevant non-medical factors" is 
without the support of substantial competent evidence in the record or case law. Expert 
testimony is not required to prove disability. Vocational opinions are purely advisory. See, 
Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 (2002); Boley v. State, Industrial 
Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 939 P.2d 854 (1997). The test is simply whether or not the 
Claimant's physical impairment together with non-medical factors, has reduced the claimant's 
capacity for gainful activity. Seese v. Ideal of Idaho, 110 Idaho 32, 714 P.2d 1 (1986). Dr. 
Collins testified that the reaching above shoulder restriction reduced Sevy' s capacity for gainful 
activity by 90%. Mr. Brownell testified it reduced it 99%. Sevy could not obtain, or engage in, 
any gainful activity except for a short time where a state welfare program paid her to be the 
designated babysitter for her grandchildren. Sevy' s capacity for, and ability to engage in, gainful 
activity was reduced. In reality her ability to engage in gainful activity was totally eliminated 
because of her anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, documented by her permanent 
impairment rating due to her industrial accident and surgery which adopted by the Commission, 
caused by her industrial accident and subsequent surgery. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Commission's incongruous reliance on Dr. Larson's twice rejected opinion was 
misdirected. Its decision should not be sustained. Its unsupportable determination that Sevy 
suffered no physical restriction/limitation from her injury/surgery is the lynchpin that caused its 
entire analysis to collapse. The Commission pursuant to statute and case law should have 
commenced its analysis by acknowledging and then proceeding from the anatomic or functional 
abnormality or loss suffered by Sevy as identified in the FCE and as quantified in her impairment 
rating. It should have then continued its analysis with the impairment rating and FCE 
restrictions/limitations in conjunction with what the Commission referred to as her 'profound' 
nonmedical factor disabilities. Sevy is totally and permanently disabled. and the Commission 
would have been in a position to apportion liability as it deemed appropriate under statute and 
case law. 
This Court should reverse the Commission's decision and remand this matter to it for 
further action consistent with awarding Sevy total disability benefits as a matter of law. On 
remand the Court should also direct the Commission to determine the portion, if any, of Sevy's 
disability that is the liability of the ISIF. 
DATE~~uly, 2014. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Sevy 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was faxed on the 
28th day of July, 2014, to the respective attorneys for the Defendants as follows: 
H. James Magnuson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2288 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
Attorney for Employer/Surety 
Thomas W. Callery 
Attorney at Law 
P.O.Box 854 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 Atto1};;~~ 
Starr Kelso 
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2 Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
The fifth edition includes most of the common con-
ditions, excluding unusual cases that require individ-
ual consideration. Since this edition encompasses the 
most current criteria and procedures for impairment 
assessment, it is strongly recommended that physi-
cians use this latest edition, the fifth edition, when . 
rating impairment. 
1.2 Impairment, 
Disability, and 
Handicap 
1.2a Impairment 
The Guides continues to define impairment as 
"a loss, loss of use, or derangement of any body 
part, organ system, or organ function." 2 This defi-
nition of impairment is retained in this edition. A 
medical impairment can develop from an illness or 
injury. An impairment is considered permanent when 
it has reached maximal medical improvement 
(MMI), meaning it is well stabilized and unlikely to 
change substantially in the next year with or without 
medical treatment. The term impairment in the 
Guides refers to permanent impairment, which is 
the focus of the Guides. 
An impairment can be manifested objectively, for 
example, by a fracture, and/or subjectively, through 
fatigue and pain.3 Although the Guides emphasizes 
objective assessment, subjective symptoms are 
included within the diagnostic criteria. According to 
the Guides, determining whether an injury or illness 
results in a permanent impairment requires a medical 
assessment performed by a physician. An impair-
ment may lead to functional limitations or the inabil-
ity to perform activities of daily living. 
Table 1-1, adapted from a report by the AMA 
Council on Scientific Affairs, lists various definitions 
of impairment and disability used by four main 
authorities: the AMA Guides, the World Health 
Organization, the Social Security Administration, 
and a state workers ' compensation statute.4 Although 
a nationally accepted definition for impairment does 
not exist, the general concept of impairment is simi-
lar in the definitions of most organizations. Several 
terms used in the AMA definition, and their applica-
tion throughout the Guides, will be discussed in this 
chapter and Chapter 2. 
Loss, loss of use, or derangement implies a change 
from a normal or "preexisting" state. Normal is a 
range or zone representing healthy functioning and 
varies with age, gender, and other factors such as 
environmental conditions. For example, normal heart 
rate varies between a child and adult and according 
to whether the person is at rest or exercising. 
Multiple factors need to be considered when assess-
ing whether a specific or overall function is normal. 
A normal value can be defined from an individual or 
population perspective. 
When evaluating an individual, a physician has two 
options: consider the individual's healthy preinjury 
or preillness state or the condition of the unaffected 
side as "normal" for the individual if this is known, 
or compare that individual to a normal value defined 
by population averages of healthy people. The 
Guides uses both approaches. Accepted population 
values for conditions such as extremity range-of-
motion or lung function are listed in the Guides; it is 
recommended that the physician use those values as 
detailed in the Guides when applicable. In other cir-
cumstances, for instance, where population values 
are not available, the physician should use clinical 
judgment regarding normal structure and function 
and estimate what is normal for the individual based 
on the physician's knowledge or estimate of the indi-
vidual's preinjury or preillness condition. 
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fifth edition does contain a number of errors that are to be corrected in the second 
printing. 
Readers are advised, "It is strongly recommended that physicians use this 
latest edition, the fifth edition, when rating impairment."4 This is similar to the 
statement in the fourth edition that "(t]he AMA strongly discourages the use of 
any but the most recent edition of the Guides.''5 It is probable some physicians 
and AMA Guides users were unaware of the availability of the fifth edition for 
so~e time. State statutes that deal with the AMA Guides may or may not specify 
which edition to use and how they are to be used. Several jurisdictions stipulate 
use of a specific edition· of the AMA Guides, and they undoubtedly analyzed the 
fifth edition to determine its impact before adopting it as the basis for rating 
impairment. 
[A] Impairment in the AMA Guides 
Impairment continues to be defined as "the . loss of, loss of use of, or 
derangement of any body part, system or function."6 Impain:nent is no longer 
defined as a condition that interferes with an individual's ability to perform activi-
ties of daily living (ADLs). It may, however, lead to functional limitations or the -
inability to perform ADLs. If an impairment does not interfere with an ADL, · it is 
not ratable. If it does interfere, it qualifies for an impairment rating. ADLs are 
specified in Table 1-2, Activities of Daily Living Commonly Measured in Activi-
ties ·of Daily Living (ADL) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) 
Scales,7 and include self-care, communications, physical activity, sensory func-
tions, nonspecialized hand activity, travel, sexual function, and sleep. ADLs no 
longer include social activities, recreational activities, and work . 
.. 
[Bl Maximum Medical lmpro'(ement 
Impairment is considered permanent when it reaches maximum medical 
improvement (MMI), meaning the impairment is well-stabilized and unlikely to 
change substantially in the next year with or without medical treatment. In the 
fourth edition of the AMA Guides, an impairment was also con_sidered permanent 
if it was unlikely to change by more than 3 percent in the next year. This criterion 
is omitted from- the fifth edition. 
The fifth edition compared definitions and interpretations of impairment and 
disability, including those promulgated by the World Health Organization (1999), 
4 ld. at 2. 
5 AMA, Guides .to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th ed. 1993) (hereinafter AMA 
Guides (4th ed. 1993)) at 5. 
6 AMA Guides (5th ed. 2000) at 2. 
7 Id. at 4. 
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IMPAIRMENT RA TING: I refer to the current 5th Addition AMA Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. I refer first to figure 15-4 on page 380 and 
determine that the ROM method of rating is appropriate based upon the fact that she has 
had more than one cervical surgery and more then one cervical related injury; and also 
based upon the fact that her imaging reveals more than one level of cervical degenerative 
disk disease. This method of rating requires the calculation of 3 separate impairment rating 
components: a diagnosis-based component, a loss of cervical range of motion-based 
component and a neurologic deficit-based component. 
I refer next to table 15-7 on page 404 and determine that her current condition corresponds 
· most closely to category IV-D which yields a 10% whole person impairment; modified 
upward by category IV-E-1 for her 2nd cervical fusion to yield a total diagnosis-based . 
impairment of 12% of the whole person. The levels of disk degeneration at the other levels 
are not sufficient to indicate inclusion as an increase in her current impairment rating; or at 
the least if they are included in both her pre-injury and post-injury ratings, no net change in 
her impairment will result as far as apportionment. For the purposes of apportionment I 
determine that her condition prior to the surgery would correspond to category IV -D alone, 
yielding a 10% whole person impairment. 
I next determine her cervical range of motion-based impairment: I refer first to table 15-12 
on page 418 and determine that ner cervical flexion range yields a 0% impairment and her 
cervical extension range yields a 00/o impairment. I refer next to table 15-13 on page 420 
and determine that her right lateral flexion range yields a 0% impairment and her left lateral 
flexion range also yields a 0% impairment. Referring next to table 15-14 on page 421 I 
determine that her cervical rotation range yields a 0% impairment. While her cervical 
ranges of motions are perhaps very slightly reduced. they are not sufficiently reduced to 
'result in an impairment greater than 0% of the whole person (rounded or interpolated). 
I note that on careful neurologic examination she exhibited no motor or sensory deficit 
sufficient to yield a ratable neurologic deficit impairment. , 
Ms. Sevy's current cervical-related impairment is thus determined by the combination of 
the component impairments:of 12%, 0% and 0% to be 12% of the whole person. Her· 
impairment rating prior to this injury had already been determined above to be 10% of the 
whole person; thus the increment in her impairment as a result of the injury and subsequent 
?d surgery upon her cervical spine is determined to be 2% of the whole person. That 2% 
whole person impairment is her apportioned impairment to the date of injury of October 31. 
2006 . 
